Vol.13, No.2, 1996 *Journal of the Australian Population Association*

Review Article

EXPLAINING AUSTRALIAN IMMIGRATION

Katharine Betts
Sociology Discipline
Swinburne University of Technology
PO Box 218 Hawthorn VIC 3122

This article reviews the post-Second World War literature on explanations for Australia's immigration program. It discovers three main schools of thought based on net pull factors: the official explanation and two unofficial explanations which focus on migrants as workers and on migrants as consumers. However the growing importance of net push factors after 1974 means that some of this work is less relevant today. Explanations focusing on net push factors have yet to cohere into a distinct perspective (or perspectives) but some research has been done on chain migration and family-based migration strategies, asylum seekers, temporary movement, and migration and the law. Immigration research is sometimes controversial and politicized. While intellectual integrity must always take priority, the values of civility and tolerance are also important.

There is now a wide literature on migration to Australia covering its consequences for the host society, its outcomes for the immigrants themselves, and offering explanations of why it has occurred. This review concentrates on explanatory work. It tries to exclude work evaluating the social, economic and environmental effects of immigration as well as studies of migrant settlement. It also passes over much of the material produced by officials charged with developing, implementing and justifying immigration policies. While the boundaries between these various bodies of literature are fuzzy, the main focus of this review is on scholarly interpretations of Australian immigration since 1945. What are the main themes and debates in this work? What explanations do they point to? Where are the gaps?

Answers to these questions do not necessarily require a history of changes in immigration policy. But changes in policy, and in the context in which it is made, can influence attempts at analysis. For example, research on chain migration may be prompted by changes in rules affecting family reunion, while the new interest in immigration and the law could not have arisen without prior changes in Australian Administrative Law and in the numbers of on-shore applicants able to use this law. Besides, the influence flowing between policy changes and analysis does not always run one way; independent writing and research can influence policy (whether it was produced with this end in view or not). For example, the white Australia

policy was reformed during the 1960s, partly in response to sustained intellectual analysis and re-evaluation. In the late 1960s the accepted definition of migrants shifted from that of grateful new Australians to victims of exploitation; this shift was a response to a critique initiated by professionals and academics. And multiculturalism was developed in the 1970s partly in response to the policy ideas of these critics. The first of these changes influenced intake policy directly, the second and third, indirectly.

Historical Background

From the beginning European settlers in Australia have been concerned about population. The arrivals of convicts and, later, of free settlers were planned and monitored and, as the nineteenth century progressed, natural increase was also subject to scrutiny. Australia has never had an overt population policy in the sense of explicit documents specifying an optimum size and distribution of the people. But most governments have supported population growth and decision makers have shown a close interest in demography. They have also developed a number of programs, incentives and disincentives which have demographic effects. Some authors argue that these deserve the title of a *de facto* population policy (Berelson 1974; UNICPD 1994:7, 29). Others find this idea unhelpful (McNicoll 1995:97).

From the end of the First World War to the end of the Second the debate about population continued. What combination of policies (pro-natalism, reductions in infant mortality, immigration) could be developed to enhance population growth? How could Australia grow? But, during the 1920s and 1930s a new question was added to this old one. Should Australia grow?[1] The debate of this era is well described in Chapter 5 of the *First Report of the National Population Inquiry*,[2] and it was a debate about natural increase as much as it was about immigration.[3] Indeed, during the Second World War some commentators believed that further growth through immigration would not be possible (see Forsyth 1942:159-163; Elkin 1947:183-188; Harris 1947:143-149). Just as Australia had experienced low birth rates during the 1930s, so had traditional source countries; this meant that the pool of acceptable immigrants was low. The literature of this period had a firm policy focus. But beyond remarking that low birth-rate countries were likely to provide few immigrants and that high-birth countries, if they were permitted

---

1 See for example: Phillips and Wood (1928); Wilkinson (1930); Forsyth (1942); NHMRC (1944); Borrie *et al.* (1947); Taylor (1947 [1940]); Forsyth (1954); Wadham *et al.* (1964 [1939]).

2 Borrie (1975). See also Borrie (1994) especially chapter 9.

3 See NHMRC (1944) and, for an account of pre-First World War concerns, Hicks (1978).

to do so, would provide many, few commentators on immigration tried to analyse why the overall patterns that they observed occurred.

During the inter-War years, critics such as Griffith Taylor expressed serious doubts about Australia's capacity to support a large population. But by the mid-1940s environmental doubts had largely been overwhelmed by fears about defence and the ability of a relatively small population to guard a continent. These were old fears, fears which had dominated much nineteenth-century thinking about Australia's population, and the recent threat of Japanese invasion gave them a new impetus. Consequently, the Chifley government's scheme for a large immigration program met with little opposition from either the general public or from policy analysts.

One aspect of the early post-Second World War immigration policy was, however, controversial: the white Australia policy. Just as sceptical geographers had asked questions about the fundamental goals of population growth before the War, now other critics began to ask questions about the means. Opposition to the white Australia policy generated a stream of publications from the Immigration Reform Group (see Rivett 1962, 1975), while the policy, and its gradual liberalization, also attracted attention from historians (Yarwood 1964; Palfreeman 1967; London 1970; Price 1974).

During the 1950s and early 1960s the immigration debate was about methods rather than final objectives. And though much of this work was scholarly in that authors developed their arguments in the language of reason and evidence, it was nonetheless usually written with an aim in view: to change the white Australia policy. In fact, by 1966, many of the more abrasive aspects of this policy had been removed (Yarwood 1988:77).

From Migrants' Problems to the Problem of Immigration

Analytic approaches to immigration as a population building strategy only began to appear in the 1960s when immigration itself became problematic. Perhaps there is a truism here. As long as a process is widely taken for granted as beneficial, commentators will focus on improving its performance. But once some individuals began to question the worth of the process, the question of why it occurs at all can be framed and put.

Immigrants and Problems

James Jupp's work, *Arrivals and Departures*, published in 1966, marks an important change in immigration scholarship. Jupp praised the work of the Immigration Department and did not raise questions about the essential aims of policy, but the problems he analysed in the settlement process contributed to a marked shift in attitudes. *Arrivals and Departures* heralded a new stream of popular and scholarly work which eventually led to critical analyses of immigration itself. In clear, terse prose, Jupp pointed out the difficulties that

many new migrants experienced. He documented the way in which the host society seemed to be oblivious to the large numbers of new arrivals from non-English-speaking backgrounds in their midst. And he also brought readers the surprising news that substantial numbers of immigrants, especially highly-prized British settlers with trade and other skills, were packing up and going home again.

In drawing attention to their settlement problems, Jupp also documented the perceptions which immigrants held about Australia and Australians. Most found Australian social services to be inadequate, housing hard to find and expensive, and cities such as Melbourne a poor substitute for London, Rome or Vienna. Many saw Australians themselves as dull, insular, suburban, prejudiced and inhospitable, while some found their new compatriots to be not only unfriendly but also drunken and violent (Jupp 1966:102-105, 109, 110-112, 119-120, 139, 158, 162; see also Kovacs and Cropley 1975:74-75).

Arrivals and Departures was the most prominent example of a growing body of work in the 1960s on the difficulties which non-English-speaking-background (NESB) migrants were experiencing in Australia, especially migrants from southern Europe. This material began to grow in volume after 1964. It consisted primarily of conference papers and articles, rather than books, and most of it was not written by immigration scholars or policy analysts. The authors were teachers, welfare workers and health professionals. Many were people in the front line, striving to deliver services with limited resources and few interpreters, in a context where little provision had been made for non-English speakers or for cultural differences.

In 1978 Jean Martin reviewed this corpus of work intensively and concluded that it had led to a shift in the way in which 'the migrant presence' was defined in Australia. By the early 1970s the public perception of immigrants had shifted. Previously they had been seen as people lucky to be here and soon to be assimilated; now they were seen as people beset by problems and social difficulties. The southern Europeans were the group most singled out by this new approach and the literature itemized their difficulties: they were exploited in the workplace; neglected in the education system; ill-treated in public hospitals; and they were victims of discrimination (Martin 1978:35, 36, 105, 209). This image of migrants as victims was based on research but, in Martin's judgement, it was only partially valid. She writes that by the end of the 1960s:

> ... a new element [entered] into the public definition of migrants; they were problems. This was less ideological than the assimilation thesis, because it could be adopted to legitimate a variety of practices and claims on resources from a range of groups — established and migrant — and because it developed out of the contributions of numerous actors who had previously never been heard. It also had a better claim to validity, but some of the new definers were as ready as the old to cite

> evidence selectively to establish their point. The emphases on migrants as 'factory fodder' and on migrant poverty are the obvious examples (*ibid.*:209).

Individual immigrants played a limited role in this redefinition, and ethnic communities had played no part at all (*ibid.*:36). Concerned professionals within the host community had drawn the new picture. And though some of them initially argued that the problems migrants experienced were due to the migrants' own shortcomings, by the early 1970s this school of thought had been out-flanked. In the eyes of most critics, immigrants' problems were rooted in the structural deficiencies of Australian society (*ibid.*:54).

Multiculturalism

By December 1972, when the Whitlam government was elected, an extensive body of research and criticism had been developed. Whitlam and his new Minister for Immigration, Al Grassby, made numerous policy changes designed to alleviate social disadvantage and to eliminate racial discrimination (including formally abolishing the remnants of the white Australia policy). Grassby did speak of a 'Multi-Cultural Society' and emphasized the legitimacy of the phrase 'ethnic background' as denoting a common attribute which all Australians shared, but neither he nor Whitlam endorsed the idea of state-sponsored pluralism (Gardiner-Garden 1993:2-5).

The Liberals had began to replace 'assimilation' with 'integration' in official statements in 1964 (Rubenstein 1993:145). While the Whitlam government did pave the way for further change it was under Fraser, not Whitlam, that 'integration' gave way to 'multiculturalism' (Castles *et al.* 1990:58-65). The foundations had been laid for this both by the earlier rejection of assimilation and by the notion of disadvantaged social categories (including immigrants). The concept of disadvantaged categories lay behind many of the Whitlam government's reforms and the idea of officially recognized ethnic groups seemed to flow naturally from it. By the mid-1970s the concept of ethnic groups was well developed and Martin writes that:

> As a complement to this changing conception of the source of migrant problems, a new notion of ethnic communities also filtered and then rushed noisily into public thinking. ... [Previously seen as marginal and transient] they now presented themselves as legitimate interest groups, integral to the social structure as a whole (Martin 1978:55; see also Castles *et al.* 1990:62).

How did the shift from assimilation to multiculturalism come about? Martin's analysis shows that the image of the 'problem migrant' played a key role. Policies of acknowledging diversity and respecting migrant cultures were promoted by Australian welfare workers and teachers in the 1960s as they struggled to serve a growing non-English-speaking clientele. These policies paved the way for multiculturalism but they were seen at that time as a means to an end, and that end was a less painful and more enduring assimilation than the forced march of older policies (Kovacs and Cropley

1975:iii, 123-125, 128; Martin 1978:33-36, 47, 54-35, 208-209). The move towards multiculturalism did not begin as a response to migrant pressures, and its objective was not cultural maintenance but the incorporation of migrants into the mainstream.

The Australian Assistance Program (AAP) of the early 1970s also gave specific encouragement to the public recognition of ethnic groups. The Whitlam government considered that migrants formed one of a number of sets of marginalized individuals and it established the AAP to help cater to the needs of people in these categories (Martin 1978:52-53; Matwijiw 1988:926). Organized ethnic communities coalesced largely in response to this policy especially during and after 1974, and some then began to play their own part in defining the migrant presence in Australia.[4] But it was not until 1979 that the various state Ethnic Communities' Councils and the Federation of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia received regular government funding (Matwijiw 1988:929; Jupp 1993:205, 219).

The change in the way migrants were perceived and the new legitimacy it gave to the idea of the ethnic group led, in the later 1970s, to a significant change in the politics of immigration. As well as working to enhance the social welfare of their communities, and to strengthen institutions promoting cultural maintenance, migrant leaders began to play close attention to the outcomes of immigration policy. Were the politicians who now courted their votes in fact demonstrating their appreciation of non-Anglo immigration, or were they still trying to focus recruitment on the British Isles? A new idea was established in the immigration debate: people who supported the rights and dignity of existing NESB immigrants should also support further NESB immigration (Betts 1988:142, 147-152). It was in this context that leaders of ethnic groups began to raise new demands for a more formal recognition of family reunion.

From late 1981 selection procedures were changed to reflect these new pressures, a change which had consequences for scholarship as well as policy. It was, however, at least ten years after Grassby's 1973 'Family of the nation speech' before these changes were recognized and analysed. But around 1970, as the new settlement policies were beginning to germinate, new questions about the intake were also being discussed.

Official Justifications and the Inertia Thesis

During the 1950s and 1960s writers on aspects of immigration and settlement were usually happy to accept official explanations for the migrant intake.

---

4 See Martin (1978:50-54, 64, 78). Ethnically based organizations did, of course, exist before the AAP and Fraser's multiculturalism but they tended to be fragmented, even within single birthplace groupings, and members were concerned more with homeland politics than with Australian political life. See Jupp (1966:39-42, 75-82, 89-91, 97-100).

These ran roughly as follows. Population growth in itself is a good thing: it is necessary for defence; it fills gaps in the labour market; and it boosts economic growth. Australia clearly needs more people and, without a migrant intake, the population will stagnate. But these themes were not usually developed and elaborated. During the 1950s and 1960s writers who adopted the official explanation usually felt that there was little actual explaining that had to be done, a trend which continues within this school of thought to the present day.[5]

In the mid-1960s Robert Menzies had commissioned the Vernon Committee to analyse Australia's economic and demographic situation. The Committee's terms of reference began with this preamble: 'Having in mind that the objectives of the government's economic policy are a high rate of economic and population growth ...' (Vernon 1965:i). The authors of the report drew their readers' attention to the fact that population growth was being taken for granted, commenting that '[population] increase, in Australia's history, has most of the time ranked as an objective in itself, in need of no special justification on economic grounds' (*ibid.*:65). They then went on to subject this goal to some analysis and to conclude that population growth was on balance beneficial (*ibid.*:65-68, 89-91).

The idea that growth was a desirable end in itself had been implicitly accepted, not just by scholars and policy-makers, but by the general public as well. In 1961 an opinion poll found that 43 per cent of respondents thought the migrant intake was too low (cited in Betts 1996a:10). The Vernon report caused a minor jolt, not because it offered any fundamental criticism of this objective, but because it drew attention to the way in which it had been uncritically accepted.

By the late 1960s, as problems with urbanization began to accumulate, and as some of the difficulties which immigrants were experiencing began to surface, a number of critics started to ask: what is immigration for? And if the answer was 'growth-for-growth's sake', they questioned whether the answer was good enough. This led to the more analytic question: why is Australia pursuing this policy?

The *How Many Australians?* conference held in 1971 provided a forum in which these topics could be debated. Critics focused on the perceived economic costs of immigration-fuelled population growth. For example, Paul Sharp argued that population growth of the magnitude experienced in Australia retarded productivity because it led to capital widening rather than capital deepening (Sharp 1971). Others deplored our ignorance of what the

---

5 See Borrie (1975:101-107); Kovacs and Cropley (1975:71); Jupp (1991:70-72, 84, 111, though cf. p.119). See also Wilton and Bosworth (1984:22, 185). Though Wilton and Bosworth adopt a critical air they in fact offer no other explanations for post-War immigration than the defence scare and some need for labour.

economic costs and benefits of immigration might actually be (Appleyard 1971). And though economics supplied the main theme, some speakers drew attention to the negative effects of population growth on the natural environment (Fenner 1971), while others argued that Australians had devalued immigrant cultures (Martin 1971). The then Minister for Immigration, The Hon. Philip Lynch, parried claims that immigration policy lacked a clear rationale, stating that '... population increase is not today ranked as an objective in itself, either by the Australian government or by the Australian people ...'. On the contrary, immigration policy was based on 'the government's appreciation of Australia's national needs and objectives' (Lynch 1971:17-18).

Despite this, critical explanations for the policy were presented. Reg Appleyard provided a neat historical overview, arguing that the 1945 to 1971 period was marked by two phases. In the first phase, up until the early 1950s, the program had been driven by concerns about defence and by the demand for labour. The second phase dated from the 1952-53 recession. Appleyard argued that, with the advent of the nuclear age, the defence rationale for a larger population had become invalid. The immediate demand for labour was also soon assuaged. The recession presented an opportunity to reassess the objectives of large-scale immigration but this opportunity was not taken. Why not? Appleyard claimed that, by the early 1950s, the economy had been conditioned to immigration. A great deal of investment had been undertaken on the expectation that immigration would continue and there were no countervailing pressures to bring it to a halt: '... if only by default, immigration had come to stay. ... the economy became well and truly conditioned to large intakes each year' (Appleyard 1971:3).

Max Walsh went on to offer a more sustained analysis of the pressures reinforcing a large intake. In doing this he lined up the interest groups for and against immigration. Among the institutional supports for high migration were: the general comfort of keeping to established policy and maintaining political bipartisanship on immigration; the Immigration Department with its natural vested interest in continuing its activities; Qantas, which was filling tens of thousands of its seats with migrants every year; and manufacturing industries, interested both in more consumers and in more workers. Walsh also argued that unions should be included in this list of supporters, at least at the executive level, because immigration brought them more members, and that some local governments might also be included. Certainly, local governments had to absorb the costs of growth but they also benefited from cheaper workers. He claimed that these groups did not usually argue for immigration in terms of their own special interests; rather, they were more likely to support it in terms of a vaguely expressed national interest, especially a

national interest in defence. This was despite the fact that 'the defence lobby, as such, has little or no interest in immigration' (Walsh 1971:168-172).

Among the potential sources of opposition Walsh listed the 'poverty belt'. But he found this 'absolutely lacking in political strength' because it depended on sympathy not power. He implied that the poor do not organize themselves into an effective pressure group because, by definition, they are not very capable individuals. He included the non-British foreign-born in this poverty belt, arguing that, with the Australian-born poor, they shared an interest in limiting further competition for jobs and services. But they were effectively disenfranchised by a lack of voting rights if they were unnaturalized, and by the fact that they tended to live in safe Labor seats. However, Walsh predicted that migrant-based welfare needs would acquire a political voice, either within the ALP or outside it (and he assumed that, when this day came, it would be a voice against further mass immigration).

Walsh also mentioned environmentalists. He was not particularly impressed by environmental arguments against population growth but said that the politics of the environment were too embryonic to predict. He was sympathetic to Sharp's economic argument, if not entirely convinced by it. But he remarked that, even if it were to be substantiated, it would have little influence among the vested interests clustered around immigration policy because 'economic rationalists' are 'not a strong lobby in this community. ... The fact that Australia's [economic] growth lags behind that of similar economies with less in the way of natural endowments is a non-issue at this stage of Australian politics' (Walsh 1971:173-176). Walsh also commented on the way in which academics had been drawn into a close association with the Immigration Department (*ibid.*:170) a point made by Jupp some six years earlier (Jupp 1966:166; see also Wilton and Bosworth 1984:21-24).

Research and Government

Academic research should, of course, help inform government policy and there is no ethical reason why scholars should not serve on government bodies. The men and women who are prepared to help fine tune government policy are often people who sincerely share the goals which policy is trying to serve. But there is a danger that if all or most immigration scholars play this role, fundamental questions may not be asked; indeed the early alliance between scholars and policy-makers could account for the readiness of many commentators to accept the official explanation for post-war migration during the 1950s and 1960s. (Sharp and Walsh were the two main critics at the 1971 conference, one a businessman and the other a journalist; both operated outside the policy circuit.)

The Immigration Department[6] has had a succession of appointed advisory councils to assist the Minister in policy formation, drawing on representatives of interest groups and on people with academic expertise. (While most of the people who served on these committees would have supported the overall objective of growth, some did not; for example Geoff Mosley and Robert Birrell. Others, while they supported growth, would have been critics of aspects of the program.) The most important advisory councils, as far as intake policy is concerned, have been: the Immigration Planning Council, 1949-75; the Australian Population and Immigration Council, 1975-81; the Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs, 1981-84; and the National Population Council (NPC), 1984 to December 1991 (Hawkins 1989:32, 118; Warhurst 1993:185-190).

Academic representation on the advisory councils meant that government could draw on advice based on systematic research. Scholars and policy-makers were also brought together through a number of government-sponsored inquiries into population and migration (some of which involved the advisory councils). And the relationship blossomed during seven well-funded years (from May 1989 to August 1996) under the Bureau of Immigration Research.[7]

The Government Reports

By the early 1970s the official explanation for the program was not under sustained attack but it was becoming less taken for granted and consequently rather more visible. During the next twenty years a loose coalition of scholars, policy-makers, politicians and interest groups collaborated on six major government reports on population and migration. The reports were focused on reviewing the consequences of immigration and population growth and on developing policies rather than on analysing why growth policies were being pursued. But they form a useful demonstration of work based on official explanations for immigration, and of the way in which this work gradually altered as new themes of multiculturalism, humanitarianism and, later, environmentalism were added to the older arguments based on defence and economics.

---

6 The Department has worn a variety of names. It was the Department of Immigration from 1945 to 1974 when it was temporarily disbanded. It was reformed as the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA) in 1976, became the Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs in 1987, was rechristened DIEA in 1993, and in March 1996 became the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The term 'Immigration Department' is used here as a generic.

7 The Bureau was renamed the Bureau of Immigration and Population Research in May 1993 and the Bureau of Immigration, Multiculturalism and Population Research in December 1994.

These six reports were: the Borrie reports of 1975 and 1978; the Green Paper of 1977 (APIC 1977); the Committee of Review on Migrant Assessment chaired by Charles Price in 1981; the FitzGerald report of 1988; the Withers report of 1991; and the Jones inquiry of 1994. All of these represent more careful attempts to place immigration within a broader policy framework than Lynch's address in 1971 though, as we shall see, they did not provoke or inspire the policy elite to clarify the official explanation for immigration. Nevertheless, some of the questions raised by the critics in 1971 (and afterwards) are considered in their pages.

Understandably, each of these reports has a political history. The Borrie report was initiated by the McMahon government in 1970 at the time when commentary on the settlement problems of immigrants was building to a head. Criticisms of the intake itself had also appeared in the press,[8] and the idea of zero population growth was attracting some support.[9] Part of the brief given to W.D. Borrie was to examine 'the desirable future population levels towards which immigration should contribute' (Borrie 1975:xxxv). The report was a wide-ranging demographic overview of the Australian people, but it stopped short of making direct policy recommendations, judging that these were the domain of politics not scholarship. However, Borrie did suggest that while the demographic 'need for immigration is currently at a low ebb', an immigration policy which aimed for a net increase of 50,000 per year was 'not inconsistent' with government policy and that, in the interests of 'balanced growth', steps should be taken to encourage these immigrants not to settle in Melbourne or Sydney (Borrie 1975:732-733, 741).

The Green Paper, written by the Australian Population and Immigration Council (APIC) and published in March 1977, was commissioned by the Fraser government in a context where policy-makers were seeking to increase immigration figures. Most of the 16 members of the Council were academics, rather than representatives of interest groups, and their report dealt with questions of family reunion and the environment as well as economics, foreign policy and defence. The paper was written just before the first major wave of boat people began to reach Darwin,[10] but it also considered the question of refugees and Australia's humanitarian obligations.

---

8 See for example the series of articles by John Hallows in *The Australian*, 1970, 8 June:7; 9 June:9; and 10 June:13.

9 Six Zero Population Growth groups made submissions to the Borrie inquiry. See Borrie (1975:759).

10 Three boats arrived in 1976 and four more in mid-1977, but the main wave began in November and December 1977. Pp.73-77 in N. Viviani, *The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia*, 1984. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. By the end of the 1970s 2,067 Vietnamese had arrived in this fashion. K. Rivett. 1988. Refugees. Pp.936 in J. Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People*, Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

The text contained many reservations about the net benefits of immigration-fuelled population growth. The authors were particularly unenthusiastic about family reunion arguing that if it were extended beyond the nuclear family, it could soon dominate the intake. This would reduce skill levels and English competence and would bias the program towards Asia and the Middle East (APIC 1977:36-37). But the authors reached two conclusions: without immigration Australia's population would stabilize more quickly and that, if immigration were to continue, skilled English-speaking migrants would adapt more readily and at less cost than other groups of immigrants (*ibid.*:93-96). In the political debate which followed, this was presented as a strong case for skilled immigration and was used to justify a new recruitment drive in Britain and northern Europe (Betts 1988:127-128).

The Committee of Review on Migrant Assessment, chaired by Charles Price, published its report late in 1981, during the period when the Fraser government was re-establishing bipartisanship on immigration policy with the then Labor Opposition. (Though many Labor spokesmen had been strong advocates for family reunion, Labor had initially doubted the wisdom of a renewed push for growth.) The Price report marks the new influence of ethnic spokespersons and community leaders, many of whom expressed grievances to the Committee over restrictions on family reunion under the selection criteria of the day. The Committee did not make recommendations; rather, it documented and analysed the submissions it had received. However, selection criteria facilitating the entry of migrants' adult brothers and sisters soon followed, a policy change which played a significant part in re-establishing bipartisanship. In effect, Labor dropped its opposition to large numbers in return for less emphasis on skilled migration and more concessions on family reunion (Betts 1988:138-140).

The FitzGerald report owed its origins to ethnic leaders' dissatisfaction with the somewhat tighter criteria for extended family reunion introduced in July 1986 and the August 1986 budget cuts affecting a number of ethnic services. Community groups hoped that their grievances would be attended to in a report prepared for a government sympathetic to their complaints. They were soon to be disappointed (Birrell and Betts 1988:261-274). While the Committee recommended even higher migration, it argued for selection policies with a greater focus on skills and on the ability to speak English. It also recommended an end to multiculturalism. Most of its policy suggestions proved controversial and were not implemented but some of the FitzGerald report's thinking was taken up in the NPC report on selection procedures which followed. This led, in 1989, to a tighter focus on applicants with recognized qualifications and some competence in English (NPC 1988).

In February 1992 the government released a report on immigration by the Population Issues Committee, a six-member sub-committee of the NPC,

chaired by Glen Withers. The Withers report also had its origins in pressure-group politics. This time, however, the impetus seems to have come not from the ethnic lobby but from the conservation movement (Betts 1993b:268-276). The Withers' team was not as well-funded as FitzGerald's and its members had less time to devote to their task. But unlike the FitzGerald report which focused almost exclusively on economics, this report took the question of the broader impact of population growth seriously.

The Committee set their analysis in the framework of four national goals: economic progress, ecological integrity, social justice and a responsible international involvement (Withers 1991:3). For the first time an official report undertook an extensive analysis of the question of the environmental impact of immigration-fuelled growth and its impact on Australian cities. FitzGerald (1988:42-43) had dismissed the natural environment in a mere 205 words while the consultants commissioned to look at the economic effects of growth had declared that it was beyond their capabilities to include the impact of population growth on the cities (Centre for International Economics 1988:67).

The Withers report made two key recommendations. The first was clearly stated: Australia should have a population policy, which encompassed immigration. The second needs to be coaxed out of the text: for environmental and urban reasons this new inclusive population policy should, or perhaps should not, aim for a lower rate of growth. But, as immigration is the only demographic variable that may be directly altered, lower population growth would mean lower immigration, perhaps a core of 55,000 per annum. Such a program would lead to a population growing to 22 million in 2030 and then stabilizing.[11] (The ambivalence with which this second goal is expressed reflected disagreements within the committee.) Neither the recommendation for a population policy nor the more fuzzily expressed recommendation for an annual program of 55,000 was implemented.

In 1994 the Parliamentary Joint-Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies chaired by Barry Jones conducted a further inquiry into the question of Australia's population future (Jones 1994). A wide range of individuals, interest groups (including many environmental groups) and a number of academics made submissions to this inquiry. The environmental focus of the report however failed to attract the interest of ethnic community groups: no submissions were received from migrant groups. Jones made only one firm demographic recommendation: Australia should have an explicit

---

11 Withers (1991:x, 109-110, 123). But the force of this suggestion is immediately negated by the claim that a program of between 80,000 and 160,000 (gross) optimizes economic goals (1992:110).

population policy (*ibid.*:147). As of November 1996 this too had not been implemented.[12]

An Official Rationale?

The reports were produced over a span of nearly 20 years. They all worked from existing official justifications for immigration, modifying and elaborating on them as circumstances changed. They did have some influence on policy, but can we deduce a coherent explanation for the program from their pages or from the political responses which they evoked?

The 1977 Green Paper was used to justify an increase in the intake; the 1981 report was part of the process of increasing the family reunion component; and the FitzGerald report led to rather more emphasis on skills in the selection process. But the distinguishing characteristic of the other three reports (Borrie, Withers and Jones) is that while they have assembled a wealth of empirical material, their recommendations have not been accepted by the governments which sought their advice. And despite the 16 years which had elapsed since the *How Many Australians?* conference, the FitzGerald Committee, in 1988, still felt obliged to recommend that the government develop a clear rationale for immigration (FitzGerald 1988:18, 119).

By 1996 has this happened? An answer to this question will depend on one's definition of 'rationale' and 'clear'. Various commentators have identified reasons for (Gardener-Garden 1993:11, 29, 138) and effects of (Holton and Sloan 1994:286, 287) immigration (some of which are discussed below). Governments have long stood by the nine principles of immigration first articulated by Malcolm MacKellar in 1978 (Gardener-Garden 1993:9, 15) but these are more concerned with how immigration policy should be implemented rather than with the ends which it should serve. In 1994 Senator Bolkus, then Minister for Immigration, presented a report to the UN population conference in Cairo. This said that:

> Australia's migration intake is designed to balance the delivery of a broad-based skilled intake with the capacity to contribute to Australia's economy, the recognition of the value and importance of family migration to Australia's social and economic goals and the maintenance of Australia's humanitarian commitment (UNICDP 1994:46).

While this was more specific than Lynch's comments in 1971, it too was closer to a description of implementation practices than a statement of national objectives. Perhaps a clear statement of objectives has been put to one side for the same reason that a population policy has been shelved. The Cairo report

12 McNicoll (1995) presents an analysis of why it is so difficult for Australia to develop a population policy and of why our stance towards population growth and settlement patterns is one of 'bizarre helplessness'.

also said that Australia did not have a population policy because a formal statement of policy 'would not be appropriate for Australia, given ... [the] diversity of community views as to the character and objectives of such a policy' (UNICDP 1994:7).

In 1971 Appleyard and Walsh had introduced the idea that a major explanation for the government's program was inertia. In the 25 years that followed, pressure groups with an interest in immigration have multiplied. So it is not surprising that a contemporary restatement of the inertia thesis should sound caustic. In 1995 Helen Hughes, one of the members of the FitzGerald Committee, claimed that the FitzGerald report had been ignored because it was 'found politically incorrect by the immigration lobbies'. She went on to say that since then, 'Immigration policy has staggered on like the proverbial drunk going from pub to pub on a Saturday night' (Hughes 1995:1).[13]

Unofficial Analyses: Migrants as Workers

The redefinition of the migrant presence which Martin documented had achieved widespread recognition by the mid-1970s. It lent an impetus to some of the official reports described above, as well as to a number of reports specifically on settlement policy such as the Galbally report and the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* (1989). While some immigrants may have resented its imagery of victimization, the redefinition in fact helped empower organized ethnic groups, bringing them political legitimacy and government funding. But the new conception of immigrants as victims of structural disadvantage also fed a new stream of critical analyses of immigration outside the circle of policy-makers and their advisers.

In the late 1970s Castles and Kosacks' (1973) solid overview of temporary labour migration in western Europe, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, caused a stir among left-wing intellectuals and introduced the concept of the reserve army of labour to migration studies. This concept had been developed by Marx in his analysis of unemployment affecting native-born workers. Castles and Kosack applied it to an analysis of international immigration (as did Manual Castells 1975, among others).

---

13 This statement is contained in a paper delivered to the Bureau's third national outlook conference. It might stand as evidence that the Bureau and the Department at that time welcomed criticism, were it not for the history behind Hughes' invitation to speak. The Minister, Senator Nick Bolkus, had personally vetoed six speakers to this conference after invitations to them had been issued (see Healy 1994). From her work on the FitzGerald Committee Hughes was known to support high migration. The Minister chose her to replace Robert Birrell, one of the critics whose work was unacceptable to him. But the press discovered news of Bolkus' intervention prior to the conference and Hughes would have been aware of the circumstances behind her late invitation. (In view of these circumstances she may well have decided to focus her paper on criticisms of the implementation of policy rather than presenting the arguments for growth for which the Minister had hoped.)

Different authors interpret the theory in slightly different ways but the essence of the reserve army thesis is this. Capitalism is subject to booms and busts. Wages tend to rise rapidly during booms, threatening to consume all of the capitalists' potential profits. But if a reserve army of unemployed workers exists, these workers can be drawn into the workforce during times of prosperity, thus reducing pressure on wages. (When the next downturn occurs, they can be pushed out again.) Marx saw the local unemployed as filling this function. However, with the extension of political rights to a wider section of the population in contemporary capitalist nations, a reserve army of adult citizens becomes politically dangerous. It is more effective for business interests to draw on foreigners, bringing them into the country during the booms and sending them back during the busts. As non-citizens they will have few political rights, especially if they are handicapped by language difficulties. If they are also marked out by ethnic differences, employers may be able to use racism to split the working class and, in this way, prevent the local workers from making common cause with the new arrivals.

The theory also claims that importing a foreign reserve army has advantages for local workers. If migrants are recruited to fill the more dirty, dangerous and low-status jobs, locals can vacate these positions and become supervisors, or white-collar workers. In these new positions they will form an aristocracy of labour and because they are not competing directly with migrants for the same kind of work, may even offer the new arrivals some limited tolerance. This means that the possibility of actively disruptive racial hostility will be reduced. There are advantages for the state as well. This is because a foreign regime will have borne the social costs of raising the migrant worker, costs which may be substantial even if he or she has limited work skills. Furthermore, the host country's social costs can be kept to a minimum if recruitment is restricted to single adults. (Indeed, employers may prefer illegal migrants because they will have even fewer rights and be more readily exploited (Castles and Kosack 1973:34-36, 245). This means that the best strategy for the state, as the ally of capital, may be to tolerate illegal immigration.)

The reserve army thesis had considerable plausibility when applied to the temporary migrant regimes of western Europe of the 1960s and early 1970s. This was confirmed when the oil shock of 1973 led to economic recession. By 1974 most European countries making use of temporary workers had ceased recruitment and were trying to repatriate their foreign workforce.

By the mid-1970s the image of the 'problem migrant' had become relatively well-established in Australia and it seemed to fulfil the predictions of the reserve army thesis. Here was a group of southern-European non-English-speaking migrants, concentrated in factory jobs, disadvantaged in education, housing and in the provision of services. Was not this evidence

that the reserve army thesis could explain immigration to Australia? A number of writers were persuaded that it was and they established a strong school of inquiry which ran counter to the official view.[14] Capitalism has a structural need to bring in immigrants during economic booms and racism helps to make the system work.

The dual labour market thesis offers another variant on this approach because it, too, argues that advanced capitalism needs migrant workers. This theory, developed in the United States by Michael Piore,[15] had originally been applied to help explain the depressed situation of many black Americans (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Collins and Henry 1994:520-542). It is built on the idea that the labour market consists of two main sub-markets, the primary and secondary labour markets. The primary labour market is the domain of large corporations and government departments. Here firms and organizations are strong enough to insulate themselves from market forces. They can do this by exercising oligopolistic control over prices and by outsourcing the parts of their operations which are subject to fluctuations in demand. In this way the insecurity of exposure to market forces is borne by suppliers in the secondary labour market. The secondary labour market is crowded with small enterprises which, as well as providing goods and services for big business and for government, also run agricultural enterprises, shops and other small businesses.

Decent working conditions, careers, annual leave and other benefits can only be found in the primary labour market. In the secondary labour market, firms and employees suffer from all of the rigours of competition. Work is casual, insecure, poorly paid, and the idea of a career and the recognition of individual merit is a pipe dream. The connection with immigration is this: local workers will not take secondary labour market jobs if they can avoid them and so employers must resort to foreign labour.[16]

The two most striking differences between this theory and the reserve army thesis are, first, that it is secondary labour market employers who benefit most from immigration, yet they are not the most powerful group among the capitalist class. But big employers profit from cheaper components and services if secondary labour market employers have access to migrant labour, so they have no reason to oppose immigration (see Birrell and Birrell 1987:41). Second, this theory tries to explain why immigration should be pursued even during high unemployment. High unemployment in the primary labour market does not mean that locals will turn to low-status secondary

---

14 See Collins (1975, 1979, 1984); Storer (1975); O'Malley (1978).

15 See Doeringer and Piore (1971); Piore (1979); Massey *et al.* (1993:440-444, 458-459).

16 For Australian examples see Storer (1984:11-14, 30-31); Collins (1984:11-13).

labour market jobs. These are jobs that locals will not do, so migrants must still be recruited.[17]

A third approach, which also depends on the premise of a need to import workers has been developed in Australia and is offered by Constance Lever-Tracy and Michael Quinlan. These authors dismiss the reserve-army and dual-labour-market theories, arguing that though these approaches do paint migrant workers as important to capitalism, they only give them a peripheral significance. Lever-Tracy and Quinlan claim that the migrant worker's role is central. Migrants are employed in production work, at the heart of the capitalist economy, where the rate of exploitation is highest. Local workers manage to escape these gruelling roles and hence are less 'productive' for capital and more marginal to the system's needs. The system's profitability depends on migrant workers (Lever-Tracy and Quinlan 1988:98, 101-102, 114).

Scholars who see immigration as the exploitation of vulnerable foreigners by powerful business interests usually approach the topic from a left-of-centre political position. For many among them analysis and interpretation are not enough: action is required. But what is to be done? Should they lobby to prevent this shameful traffic in human beings or should they work to alleviate its more degrading aspects? Some initially considered the former course of action. When unemployment rose in 1974 and 1975 and the Whitlam Government reduced the intake, this was generally considered a sensible step. It was seen to be in the interests of local workers and of prospective immigrants. But by the late 1970s left-wing intellectuals and immigration scholars tended to try to combine a pro-immigration stance with a concern to alleviate the problems of existing migrants (see for example Collins 1988:282). Arguments about family reunion, put by the ethnic lobby, and about humanitarianism, pressed by refugee advocates, convinced them that support for immigration was the progressive course and that resistance to it was reactionary. (This inflection in their position may have made it easier for some scholars in this group to serve on official bodies under the Hawke/Keating governments.)

Unofficial Analyses Continued: Migrants as Consumers

For a number of analysts theories based on migrants' labour-market experiences explain why Australia organized a mass migration program and why many immigrants experience difficulties. But Robert and Tanya Birrell evaluated these theories in the late 1970s and became early sceptics. They pointed out that migrants to Australia were not brought in on a temporary basis, that they were encouraged to bring their spouses and children and that,

17 Some critics deny that such jobs exist. For a critique coming from the United States, see Beck (1996:100-135).

while migrants' working conditions were often unpleasant, they were paid award wages and some groups were doing well in economic terms. The Birrells also argued that NESB migrants had not been actively preferred; policy-makers had wanted to bring in English-speakers and had only accepted other immigrants because English-speakers were scarce and they had large targets to meet.

For these authors the Australian immigration program was driven by the pursuit of numbers. Why? Because of the demands of business interests seeking, not workers, but consumers. This 'growth of the domestic-market' thesis did acknowledge that some employers had become accustomed to migrant workers and were happy to accept more, especially as turnover rates were high, but they argued that this phenomenon was a consequence of policy rather than a cause (Birrell and Birrell 1978, 1987). The Birrells' theory has some affinity with the earlier inertia thesis but it has not attracted a school of enthusiastic adherents in the same way as the reserve army thesis. (It was, however, adopted by the present author in a work designed more to explain how recent mass migration had been managed rather than why: see Betts 1988.)

Though the Birrells cannot be said to have founded a school of thought they have had an impact. As far as broader influence is concerned their work has, by the mid-1990s, probably become more important for the basis it provides for environmentalists concerned about the deleterious effects of population growth, especially growth in the numbers of enthusiastic consumers, than it has as a focus for immigration studies.[18] Robert Birrell's work on chain migration in the late 1980s has also had an influence on policy. As a member of the NPC, he contributed to the 1988 report on selection procedures and the Withers report. Critics from both of the two unofficial schools have served on government bodies. Birrell, for example, served on the NPC and on the Bureau's advisory committee (though his position there was not renewed under Senator Bolkus' term as Minister). Birrell brought a focus on population control, labour market problems and environmental stress to these forums. Stephen Castles has also served on the Bureau's advisory committee (and other bodies) and has offered policy-makers the case for more attention to family reunion and ethnic rights.

From Pull to Push and the Need for New Explanations

The three approaches to understanding immigration discussed above (the official approach, migrants as workers, and migrants as consumers) could all be described as theories based on pull factors, because they look for

---

18 See for example many of the contributions in the following collections: Birrell *et al.* (1984); Day and Rowland (1988); Smith (1991).

explanations for migration within interest groups in the host country, groups which are presumed to gain from recruiting immigrants. It is ironic that well-thought out theories based on pull factors have flourished in Australia and overseas since the mid-1970s because, after 1974, changes in the nature of immigration were already beginning to make these theories at least partly obsolete. Much of the work discussed in the rest of this paper suggests that push factors are now more important, impelling people to cross borders in the absence of active recruitment and even in the face of some attempts at exclusion. If this is so existing theories must be revised. But before the implications of such a change can be considered the terms 'push' and 'pull' need to be defined more clearly.

Defining 'Pull' and 'Push'

The term 'pull factor' is not always used in the sense of active recruitment by interests within the host country. There are a variety of explanatory theories which talk of pull, and push, factors but which mean pull and push as they are experienced from the point of view of the potential immigrant (or his or her household).

For example, under the 'neo-classical' approach, or the 'new economics' theory potential movers weigh up the net costs and benefits of attempting to emigrate. This means that they consider the pull of the attractions in the new country together with the push of negative factors in their home country and evaluate these against the expense and risk of moving. Massey *et al.* (1993) have assembled and evaluated a range of theories of this type. These theories are not discussed here at any length simply because they have not been widely applied in Australia. Despite this, the theories are interesting because they locate the cause for moving within the immigrants' perceptions of their situations rather than within the host countries' economic and political institutions.

But the distinction between push and pull when perceived from the migrant's point of view is confusing. Clearly, if a person is to attempt a move he or she must see some attraction (pull) in the target country as well as some reason to depart (push) in the home country. From this perspective active recruiters in the target country may add to that country's attractions but they are not necessary for pull factors to operate. Political stability, family ties and a decent welfare system may be enough. But we cannot say that a potential migrant's actions are governed by push *or* pull: if any benefits are to be perceived at all both push and pull are required. The decision to try to move will involve weighing up the benefits of both against the costs of breaking old ties, making a journey and so on.

In order to keep immigrants' motives separate from those of recruiters, I will use 'net push factors' to describe the individual's assessment of the

benefits of moving minus its costs and keep 'pull factors' for the interests of groups and individuals with the power to influence migration policy in the target country. Indeed if interests favouring recruitment or acceptance of migrants are balanced against interests favouring control or resistance, we can think of 'net pull factors'.

Possible Sources of New Theories

Most of the theories which Massey *et al.* (1993) describe are net push factor theories. Useful though they are, they do tend to have an apolitical cast treating recruitment or control policies, net pull factors, as extraneous variables outside the capacity of the theoretical models. The authors do suggest that decision makers might draw on the theories they discuss in order to develop more effective policies (Massey *et al.* 1993:440, 448, 450, 451, 463) but the models they describe do not attempt to encompass policy-making itself.

The three sets of net pull factor theories discussed above offer ideas of where to look for explanations on the net pull side of the push-pull equation, but some may be too specific to particular times and circumstances to be helpful to contemporary scholars. Here Gary Freeman's recent meta-theory of how net pull factors are generated within host countries may help. Freeman's general theory of the policy-making process is based on the political economy of the receiving state and was devised to explain why immigration continues in the United States (and other democracies) despite public opposition to it. He argues that the economic and political benefits of immigration are concentrated in such a way that the pro-immigration minority are able to enjoy them while the economic and social costs are diffused. The majority pays these costs of immigration and is disaffected but, because the costs are diffuse, individuals within the majority are not motivated to organize and to argue for effective controls. This theory of concentrated benefits and diffused costs offers an overall model to explain why if even only a few groups wish to recruit or accept immigrants they may be successful and thus why push factors from foreigners may not be resisted (Freeman 1995:881-901).

The 1974 recession marked a turning point in most Western democracies which had been accepting immigrants (either temporary or permanent).[19] In many cases active recruitment ceased and while immigration in fact continued, the composition of migrant flows changed. While some pull factors do still operate (including ethnic groups established within the host country lobbying for more family reunion) net push factors now play a greater role. Today

---

19 For Europe see Castles (1984:3). For Australia see Betts (1988:2-3, 120-121) and Hugo (1996b:24, 36). Though 1965 is a more pivotal year than 1974 in that country, for the United States see Bouvier (1991:18-19). For Canada see Hawkins (1989:63-75).

family reunion migrants and asylum seekers make up a large part of the migrant flow in general and of movement into the developed world in particular.[20] Much family reunion migration today is not based on the desire to reunite with relatives from whom one has become accidentally sundered. Rather it has a strategic aspect as families strive to get one 'anchor' person established in a Western country, a person who can then sponsor them to join him or her later.[21]

Freeman's work could be drawn on to help explain the shifting balance between recruitment, acceptance and resistance within the receiving country (net pull), while a theory based on net push factors could be combined with this. If both aspects of the migratory flow are considered such an approach could offer a comprehensive perspective on international movement. There are a number of moves being made which could result in such a synthesis, though none has achieved any clear dominance either in Australian immigration studies or in work on immigration in comparable nations overseas.

A general feature of a theory including net push factors must run as follows. Conditions in some of the countries from which migrants come are so unpleasant (in relative or absolute terms) that people will try to get out and go somewhere less disagreeable if they can, irrespective of the demand for their labour or skills in the countries of destination. Popular fears that push pressures may lead to unmanageable numbers of immigrants have been a part of European politics since the 1970s and, in Britain, since the early 1960s (Freeman 1979:103-107). A number of scholars believe these fears to be overstated (Zolberg 1993), or that countries which are favoured destinations are able, or will be able, to control the inflow (Freeman 1994). In many respects the effects of push factors are more evident in countries such as the United States which put more emphasis on family reunion than does Australia (see Briggs 1992, 1993; Brimelow 1995), or in countries like France, Germany and Britain which are officially closed to new immigrants but find it hard to restrict the entry of family members and asylum seekers (Freeman 1992; Bosswick 1993; Wihtol de Wenden 1994; Coleman 1995). But given the political tension which the image of uncontrollable immigration can generate, sound understanding of the processes at work is essential.

Parts for the Whole: Elements for a New Theoretical Approach

Systematic theories of migration in Australia which incorporate net push factors are still embryonic, but components for a future synthesis exist. For

---

20 See for example Bouvier (1991:45-54); Briggs (1992:137-154); Bosswick (1993); Widgren (1994); Wihtol de Wenden (1994:81-90); Coleman (1995).

21 See Birrell (1996). *The Social Contract*, vol. 6, no. 1, (1996) carries a collection of short articles on the concept of the 'anchor baby' in the United States.

example, there is Australian work which demonstrates the salience of net push factors. A recent study of migrant doctors found that 70 per cent had entered under family or humanitarian categories and that only 13 per cent had found work as doctors (Kidd and Braun 1992:12). And while many professionals, including engineers, have entered under points-tested selection categories, these categories have not been clearly targeted to employment opportunities in Australia and many professionals, especially the engineers, have not been able to find work which uses their qualifications (Hawthorne 1994:11-15, 27-40).

Chain Migration, Asylum Seekers and the Migration Industry

Immigration driven by net push factors does not depend on political decisions made within the receiving country and this means that it is, of its nature, harder to control. But the shift in emphasis from net pull to net push is compounded by other changes. These may be called changes in 'intervening variables', variables affecting the facility with which people can move (Martin 1995). They include personal networks. Most people have always preferred to move to areas where there were friends and relatives to ease the adjustment. But personal networks are now being augmented by the communications revolution (telephones, television, movies, radio and now the Internet) and by the revolution in transport.

There is research which looks at migrant networks in the settlement process (Shu 1996), but if it is to help explain current migration pressures it may have to be recast to cope with more macroscopic changes. It would not, however, have to begin from scratch. Charles Price's pioneering history and ethnography introduced the idea of chain migration into Australian immigration studies in the early 1960s (Price 1963) and work has been done on contemporary family reunion chains in Australia.[22] The role of ethnic lobbyists within Australia in shifting the emphasis of intake policy from British tradesmen to relatives of NESB immigrants, and thus facilitating push factor immigration, has also received some attention (Birrell 1984, 1987).

Changes in communication and transport are an integral part of the globalization of market economies, a process which has gathered pace since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 (Thurow 1996:9-17, 127-131, 166). The effects of these changes on migration are compounded by Western societies' eagerness to encourage tourists and overseas students, some of whom enter on temporary visas and subsequently try to change their status legally or to remain on illegally. The growth in on-shore asylum-seekers is shaped by these trends: most of the on-shore asylum-seekers in Australia since the late

22 Birrell (1990, 1995); Morrissey *et al.* (1991:50-51, 59-60); Thomas and Balnaves (1993:3-4, 20-25); Iredale (1994, 1995).

1980s have been people from the People's Republic of China, originally recruited as students on temporary visas, rather than unauthorized boat arrivals.[23]

Work has been done on the consequences of these shifts for immigration to Australia (Betts 1993b; Birrell 1994a, 1994c): more is needed. At the same time as the movement of temporary migrants has been facilitated, paid intermediaries working in the often shadowy migration industry now play a greater role in helping temporaries become permanent or in facilitating illegal movement (Betts 1996b; Hugo 1996b). We do not know very much about this industry. If we are to understand contemporary migrant flows we need to know more.

Temporary Movement

Official recruitment of permanent settlers now accounts for only a tiny fraction of an increased sum of movement worldwide and though official permanent immigration to Australia expanded during the 1980s, temporary and short term movement grew far more (Sloan and Kennedy 1992; Hugo 1996b:25). Tourists and other temporary residents now make a significant contribution to the population of many countries and, through the process of category jumping, may become permanent. (Category jumping occurs when a person classified as a temporary mover becomes permanent and *vice versa*. For example, a person may leave Australia saying that their departure is only temporary, but stay overseas permanently. Or a person may arrive on a temporary visa yet stay on permanently.) Category jumping into Australia became a significant factor between 1977 and 1988. In the past, where this had occurred, it was more likely to be a question of category jumping out of Australia (Betts 1988:181-184; Price 1993:32-35). From 1989 to 1992 this earlier pattern was re-established but, by 1995, net total migration was once again well in excess of the official permanent settler figures, indicating that category jumping into Australia was occurring again.[24]

Growth in the numbers of tourists, overseas students and of workers on short term visas means that more attention needs to be focused on temporary movement. While some people on temporary visas may stay on permanently, others are indeed only temporary. But if they stay in the country on renewable four year visas, and if they come and go in sufficiently large numbers, their impact on a nation's economy, society and natural environment may be significant. While some work has been done (Bell 1995; Kinnard 1996),

---

23 Joint Standing Committee on Migration Regulations (1992:38-40, 96-98); Joint Standing Committee on Migration (1994:2, 14-25).

24 There were 96,970 permanent arrivals in 1995 but the net total figures were 105,800, *Australian Demographic Statistics*, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, Catalogue No. 3101.0, December 1995.

migration scholars in Australia have been slow to come to terms with temporary movement.

Migration and the Law

Changes in communications, transport, tourism and the way in which education is marketed are combining to convert the winding pathways of personal networks into broad highways.[25] And the rights revolution can provide an additional lane to this highway. Increased sensitivity to individual rights now means that once people get into a Western democracy, they can appeal against decisions to exclude them, extend their time of residence, and possibly remain indefinitely. While most of the more developed nations are no longer actively recruiting migrants, political and judicial institutions within these nations can mean that once a foreigner gains entry he or she is difficult to expel. This difficulty is particularly acute if the person claims refugee status and asks for political asylum.

From one point of view Australia is minimally affected by this trend because the nation is a remote island continent far from the main travel routes (Cronin 1993:85-87). But globalization is shrinking distances and an active immigration program may signal that Australia is an attractive destination. Research has been done on aspects of domestic legal rights and immigration control (Birrell 1992, 1994b; Freeman 1992, 1994; Schuck 1992; Cronin 1993). There is also a growing body of work on Australian laws and regulations concerning immigration with especial reference to on-shore applicants, the group for whom these laws are most relevant (Crock 1990; Arthur 1991; Cooney 1995; Duignan and Staden 1995; Goddard and Patel 1995).

Much has now been written on what Australia's response to boat people and other on-shore asylum-seekers ought to be (see Crock 1993; Hamilton 1993; Mathew 1995), but apart from Nancy Viviani's fine book on the Indo-Chinese boat-people, *The Long Journey* (1984), there have been few extensive scholarly analyses of the reasons for movements of this kind and the reasons for Australia's response to it (but see Betts 1993b and Cronin 1993). Analyses of democracies' responses to immigration driven by net push factors will inevitably have a greater focus on the law than was the case with work on the first wave of migrants from 1945 to 1974, people who were usually actively recruited.

Cosmopolitan Postmodern Immigration Theory?

Political responses to economic globalization have had dramatic effects on Australia's domestic economy and foreign trade. Globalism is also associated

25 The metaphor is Philip Martin's, personal communication, October 1993.

with the growth of push factors in migration flows. Australian scholars may still be looking for an explanatory framework for immigration in the 1990s but they are not taking an isolationist approach to their topic. The body of work comparing Australian immigration with immigration in other countries is growing.[26] Some, however, have drawn quite explicitly on the theme of globalization. Jupp (1995:6), for example, argues that planned immigration is necessary now that 'Australia is part of a global society in which people, resources and ideas are all very mobile', while official explanations now draw on globalism and humanitarianism and multiculturalism as much as they do on economics. But in contrast to the 1940s, if defence enters into the argument it is usually in the modified form of deterring aggression, not by force, but by demonstrating the nation's credentials as a good international citizen (Betts 1988:107-110).

Some of the novelty of the new patterns in migration which Australia is now experiencing, especially the growth in temporary migration, stems from changes in the world economy. A number of authors consider that these changes (along with a range of other social trends) are of such significance that we can be said to have moved from the 'modern' era into a new 'post-modern' period. For them postmodern society is characterized by a decline in the importance of manufactured goods *vis-à-vis* services and information, an emphasis on consumption rather than production, the decay of universalistic systems of meaning, an erosion of boundaries between popular and high culture (Milner 1991:106), the replacement of evidence and reason as grounds for debate by mutually incomprehensible 'language games', and an emphasis on 'efficiency' as a pseudo ultimate goal (Lyotard 1993:374).

These writers claim that the significance of communications and information systems has grown, while the authority of science and the nation state has declined. The postmodern world is characterized by constant change, flux and fragmentation. Pluralism replaces certainty and truth itself is transient, local and relative.[27] Is this characterization of contemporary society valid and, if it is, what are the consequences for immigration and immigration studies?

Many postmodernists now argue that our sense of belonging is no longer linked to the nation state. We are no longer moved by patriotism. We still have attachments which bind us to other human beings but they are local in scope; we identify with little groups, with ethnic communities, families, and suburbs rather than with a broader community of fellow citizens. Postmodern

---

26 Hawkins (1989); Freeman and Jupp (1992); Castles and Miller (1993) (especially chapter 5, 'The migratory process: a comparison of Australia and Germany'); Parkin and Hardcastle (1993); Adelman *et al.* (1994); Ongley and Pearson (1995); Hugo (1996b).

27 See for example Castles *et al.* (1990:106, 139-141); A. Milner (1991:116-117); J.-F. Lyotard (1993:379).

men and women are postnational. This shift in sentiment means that the power of the old well-defined modern nation state is being worn away from the inside. At the same time the forces of capital have been cut loose from their former moorings within particular nations and now surge in a footloose, rootless fashion around the whole world. This globalization of capital also affects the power of nations but in a different way. National governments' loss of control over their economies means that they have less to offer their nominal citizens in return for the citizens' loyalty and commitment.[28] This loss of control erodes the idea of the nation as a relevant political structure from the outside.

A contrary argument, however, could run as follows. Global capitalism carries with it no promise of peace, justice or environmental protection. Its disruptive effects may lead to growing numbers of political and environmental refugees (see Kane 1995; Kaplan 1996). In response to growing instability nation states may become more rather than less important to their citizens. (One well-placed observer predicts a renationalization of capital within ten years: Daly 1994:187.) In a context of widespread civil unrest careful immigration policies would become more necessary not less.

Stahl *et al.* (1993) provide a useful overview of some of the current changes in international migration, an overview which could contribute to either of the perspectives outlined above. Hugo has also taken a measured approach to the impact of global markets and the communications revolution on Australian immigration (Hugo 1994:4-6; 1996b), and to environmental stress as a contribution to push factors (Hugo 1996a). But a new theoretical perspective (or perspectives) with the power to explain both the forces impelling people to move and the responses of the receiving states has yet to emerge.

A Politicized Field of Research

Theories based on net pull factors are more developed in Australia than are theories based on net push factors. Three broad trends have been identified within these pull factor theories. There is a semi-official strand where scholars have worked closely with immigration policy-makers in work that, while critical of aspects of the policy, nonetheless has few fundamental questions to ask about it. The major government reports are located here, as is most of the work commissioned by the former Bureau of Immigration Research. (A range of bibliographies useful to scholars of any persuasion is also associated with this work.)[29] The value of the research commissioned by

---

28 See Castles *et al.* (1990:137-141, 148, 180, 188); Turner (1993:13-16); Gunew (1994:11); Horsman and Marshall (1994:209, 238-246).

29 See for example Price (1979) and BIR (1991a, 1991b).

the Bureau has been the topic of some debate though, given the patronage at its disposal, it is not surprising that little criticism has found its way into print. For some authors it has been 'one of the best resources for informed discussion of immigration anywhere in the world' (Jupp 1995:2)[30] and its work 'has provided an extensive basis for ... [the] policy formulation process' (Nieuwenhuysen 1995:17), while others such as Clark (1996:19), Poate (1994) and Cocks (1996:223) claim that the Bureau was ineffective as a sponsor of good explanatory work, and even that it used its funding 'to manipulate public debate and to suppress critical views' (Clark 1996:19).

Writers within the unofficial schools are also critical of each others' work. On occasion the language used is harsh and intemperate, designed not to refute opposing theories but to discredit theorists, labelling them as incompetent or as biased political advocates.

Immigration is now a politicized field of research and scholars may find themselves embroiled in policy debates which become heated, uncivil and personal. This atmosphere has led to a feeling that critical discussion of immigration (and even some types of research) is 'taboo'; freedom of speech has been denied. The fair reply to this claim is that no one has been gaoled or prosecuted for asking unpopular questions. However, scholars who ask such questions may suffer attacks which people who work in other disciplines are spared. For some observers this is simply a risk that such scholars must run. To engage in research of this kind is necessarily to take part in a political debate 'and anyone who chooses to engage in public debate on issues of political weight and emotional intensity has to expect to meet opposition and that some of it will express itself in the form of name-calling or abuse' (Reynolds 1996).

Research on any politically sensitive topic risks attracting a vigorous and unpleasant reaction. The difference for some immigration scholars is that the offensive may come, not from uninformed members of the general public, but from professional colleagues. The most egregious example concerns the historian Geoffrey Blainey. In 1984 a group of his colleagues, distressed by Blainey's comments on immigration, clubbed together to write a book (Markus and Rickleffs 1985) designed to attack the edifice of his professional reputation 'with the jackhammers'.[31] Such an attempt does not amount to a denial a free speech. But subjecting authors who transgress boundaries drawn by some of their peers to sustained *ad hominem* attacks sets a price on free speech.

---

30 See also the favourable report produced by the Menadue Committee (1994), and Bell (1996:14).

31 "Historians tackle the legend of Blainey 'head on' in new book", *The Australian*, 16 February 1985.

In 1993 Jeremy Bruer and John Power described the Department of Immigration as an increasingly 'distempered bureaucracy' because of the many pressures bearing on its decisions and the growing institutional conflicts affecting its work (Bruer and Power 1993:112-117). In a similar fashion the field of immigration research can be described as distempered. Irreconcilable differences in particular scholars' political ideals cannot be wished away. But civility and a willingness to credit that even those whose perspective differs from our own are probably working in good faith may encourage more researchers to the field. We should tolerate difference in theoretical approaches; the criteria for accepting or rejecting a point of view must be how much does it explain and how well does it do this. We cannot advance our understanding of contemporary migration in any other way.

References

Historians tackle the legend of Blainey 'head on' in new book. 1985. *The Australian*, 16 February.

Adelman, H., A. Borowski, M. Burstein and L. Foster (eds). 1994. *Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared* (Two volumes). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Appleyard, R.T. 1971. Immigration and the Australian economy. In *How Many Australians? Immigration and Growth, Australian Institute of Political Science, Proceedings of the 37th Summer School*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

Arthur, E. 1991. The impact of administrative law on humanitarian decision-making. Fair and Open Decision Making: 1991 Administrative Law Forum, Lakeside Hotel, Canberra.

Australian Bureau of Statistics. 1995. *Australian Demographic Statistics*. Catalogue No. 3101.0. Canberra.

Australian Population and Immigration Council (APIC). 1977. *Immigration Policies and Australia's Population: a Green Paper*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Beck, R. 1996. The *Case Against Immigration*. New York: Norton.

Bell, M. 1995. Temporary overseas workers — deregulating the market. *People and Place* 3(1):54-58.

Bell, M. 1996. RIP BIMPR. *Demoz* 40 (September):14.

Berelson, B. 1974. Introduction. In B. Berelson (ed.), *Population Policy in Developed Countries*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Betts, K. 1988. *Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Betts, K. 1993a. Australia's new population report. *The Social Contract* 3(4):268-276.

Betts, K. 1993b. Refugee-status procedures and the boat people. *People and Place* 1(3):9-15.

Betts, K. 1996a. Immigration and public opinion in Australia. *People and Place* 4(3):9-20.

Betts, K. 1996b. International migration. In P.W. Newton and M. Bell (eds), *Population Shift: Mobility and Change in Australia*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Birrell, R. 1984. A new era in Australia's immigration policy. *International Migration Review* 18(1):65-84.

Birrell, R. 1987. The demographic implications of changes in family reunion regulations, *Journal of the Australian Population Association* 4(2):151-156.

Birrell, R. 1990. *The Chains that Bind: Family Reunion Migration to Australia in the 1980s*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Birrell, R. 1992. Problems of immigration control in liberal democracies: the Australian experience. In G. Freeman and J. Jupp (eds), *Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United States, and International Migration*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Birrell, R. 1994a. Immigration control in Australia. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 534(July):106-117.

Birrell, R. 1994b. Implications of the November 1993 and January 1994 amnesties: how many will be affected and at what cost? *People and Place* 2(1):34-41.
Birrell, R. 1994c. The outcome of the 1 November 1993 decisions. *People and Place* 2(3):39-46.
Birrell, R. 1995. Spouse migration to Australia. *People and Place* 3(1):9-16.
Birrell, R. 1996. Managing the cost and scale of family reunion: current dilemmas. *People and Place* 4(4):58-67.
Birrell, R. and K. Betts. 1988. The FitzGerald report on immigration policy: origins and implications. *Australian Quarterly* 60(3):261-274.
Birrell, R. and T. Birrell. 1978. The dynamics of immigration policy. In R. Birrell and C. Hay (eds), *The Immigration Issue in Australia*. Bundoora: Department of Sociology, La Trobe University.
Birrell, R. and T. Birrell. 1987. *An Issue of People*. First Edition 1981. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
Birrell, R., D. Hill and J. Nevill (eds). 1984. *Populate and Perish? The Stresses of Population Growth in Australia*. Sydney: Fontana/Australian Conservation Foundation.
Borrie, W.D. 1975. *First Report of the National Population Inquiry*. Supplementary Report, 1978. Canberra: The Government Printer of Australia.
Borrie, W.D. 1994. The *European Peopling of Australasia: A Demographic History, 1788-1988*. Canberra: Department of Demography, The Australian National University.
Borrie, W.D., G. Cuthbert, G.L. Wood, H.L. Harris and A.P. Elkin (eds). 1947. *A White Australia: Australia's Population Problem: Twelfth Summer School of the Australian Institute of Political Science*. Sydney: The Australasian Publishing Co. Pty. Ltd.
Bosswick, W. 1993. The impact of reforms in German asylum law. *People and Place* 1(4):18-24.
Bouvier, L. 1991. *Peaceful Invasions: Immigration and Changing America*. Washington: Center for Immigration Studies.
Briggs, V. 1992. *Mass Immigration and the National Interest*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Briggs, V. 1993. U.S. asylum policy and the new world order. *People and Place* 1(3):1-9.
Brimelow, P. 1995. *Alien Nation: Common Sense about America's Immigration Disaster*. New York: Random House.
Bruer, J. and J. Power. 1993. The changing role of the Department of Immigration. In J. Jupp and M. Kabala (eds), *The Politics of Australian Immigration*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Bureau of Immigration Research (BIR). 1991a. *Immigration Policies, 1945-1991*. Library Bibliography Series. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Bureau of Immigration Research (BIR). 1991b. *Immigrants and Australian Politics*. Library Bibliography Series. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Castells, M. 1975. Immigrant workers and class struggles in advanced capitalism: the Western European experience. *Politics and Society* 5(5):47-53.
Castles, S. 1984. *Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities*. London: Pluto Press.
Castles, S. and G. Kosack. 1973. *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*. London: Oxford University Press.
Castles, S. and M. Miller. 1993. The *Age of Migration*. Houndmills: Macmillan.
Castles, S., M. Kalantzis, B. Cope and M. Morrissey. 1990. *Mistaken Identity*. Sydney: Pluto Press.
Centre for International Economics. 1988. The relationship between immigration and economic performance. In Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies, *Immigration: A Commitment to Australia*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Clark, H. 1996. Current Australian immigration policies: policy design and the case for reform. Workshop: Immigration and Australia's population in the 21st Century, Canberra.
Cocks, D. 1996. *People Policy*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
Coleman, D.A. 1995. Spouse migration from the Indian sub-continent to the UK: a permanent migration stream? *People and Place* 3(1):1-8.
Collins, J. 1975. The political economy of post-war immigration. In E.L. Wheelwright and K. Buckley (eds), *Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism*. Sydney: Australian and New Zealand Book Company.
Collins, J. 1979. The political economy of post war Australian immigration. Masters thesis (unpublished), University of Sydney, Sydney.
Collins, J. 1984. Immigration and class: the Australian experience. In G. Bottomley and M. de Lepevanche (eds), *Ethnicity, Class and Gender in Australia*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Collins, J. 1988. *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land*. Sydney: Pluto Press.
Collins, J. and F. Henry. 1994. Racism, ethnicity and immigration. In H. Adelman, A. Borowski, M. Burstein and L. Foster (eds), *Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared* (Two volumes). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Cooney, S. 1995. *The Transformation of Migration Law*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Crock, M. 1990. Immigration. In J. Wallace and T. Pagone (eds), *Rights and Freedoms in Australia*. Annandale, NSW: The Federation Press.
Crock, M. (ed.). 1993. *Protection or Punishment? The Detention of Asylum-Seekers in Australia*. Annandale, NSW: The Federation Press.
Cronin, K. 1993. A culture of control: an overview of immigration policy-making. In J. Jupp and M. Kabala (eds), *The Politics of Australian Immigration*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Daly, H.E. 1994. Fostering environmentally sustainable development: four parting suggestions for the World Bank. *Ecological Economics* 10(3):183-187.
Day, L. and D. Rowland (eds). 1988. *How Many More Australians?* Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
Doeringer, P. and M. Piore. 1971. *Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis*. Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books.
Duignan, J. and F. Staden. 1995. *Free and Independent Immigration Advice: An Analysis of Data Collected by the IARC July 1990-November 1992*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Elkin, A.P. 1947. Is white Australia doomed? In W.D. Borrie, G. Cuthbert, G.L. Wood, H.L. Harris and A.P. Elkin (eds), *A White Australia: Australia's Population Problem: Twelfth Summer School of the Australian Institute of Political Science*. Sydney: The Australasian Publishing Co. Pty. Ltd.
Fenner, F.J. 1971. The environment. In *How Many Australians? Immigration and Growth, Australian Institute of Political Science, Proceedings of the 37th Summer School*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.
FitzGerald, S. 1988. *Immigration: A Commitment to Australia*. Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Forsyth, W.D. 1942. *The Myth of Open Spaces: Australian, British and World Trends of Population and Migration*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Forsyth, W.D. 1954. The Australian population problem. In G.L. Wood (ed.), *Australia: Its Resources and Development*. New York: Macmillan.
Freeman, G. 1979. *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Freeman, G. 1992. Migration policy and politics in the receiving states. *International Migration Review* 26(4):1144-1167.
Freeman, G. 1994. Can liberal states control unwanted migration? *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 534(July):17-30.
Freeman, G. 1995. Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states. *International Migration Review* 24(4):881-901.
Freeman, G. and J. Jupp (eds). 1992. *Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United States, and International Migration*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Galbally, F. 1978. *Migrant Services and Programs: Report of the Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services for Migrants*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Gardiner-Garden, J. 1993. *The Multiculturalism and Immigration Debate: 1973-1991 (Background Paper No. 8)*. Canberra: Parliamentary Research Service.
Goddard, J. and A. Patel. 1995. *The Immigration Kit: A Practical Guide to Australia's Immigration Laws: Fourth Edition*. Sydney: The Federation Press.
Gunew, S. 1994. Arts for a multicultural Australia: redefining the culture. In S. Gunew and F. Rizvi (eds), *Culture, Difference and the Arts*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Hallows, J. 1970. *The Australian*, 8 June:7; 9 June:9; and 10 June:13.
Hamilton, A. 1993. Three years hard. *Eureka Street* 3(1):24-30.
Harris, H.L. 1947. Australians from overseas. In W.D. Borrie, G. Cuthbert, G.L. Wood, H.L. Harris and A.P. Elkin (eds), *A White Australia: Australia's Population Problem: Twelfth Summer School of the Australian Institute of Political Science*. Sydney: The Australasian Publishing Co. Pty. Ltd.

Hawkins, F. 1989. *Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared*. Kensington: New South Wales University Press.

Hawthorne, L. 1994. *Labour Market Barriers for Immigrant Engineers in Australia*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Healy, E. 1994. The management of the immigration portfolio under Senator Bolkus. *People and Place* 2(4):37-45.

Hicks, N. 1978. *'This Sin and Scandal': Australia's Population Debate 1891-1911*. Canberra: Australian National University Press.

Holton, R. and J. Sloan. 1994. Immigration policy — intake and settlement issues. In M. Wooden, R. Holton, G. Hugo and J. Sloan (eds), *Australian Immigration: A Survey of the Issues*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Horsman, M. and A. Marshall. 1994. *After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder*. London: Harper Collins.

Hughes, H. 1995. Appropriate targeting? A critique of the Australian immigration program. Third National Immigration and Population Outlook Conference, Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research, Adelaide, 22-24 February.

Hugo, G. 1994. Introduction. In M. Wooden, R. Holton, G. Hugo and J. Sloan (eds), *Australian Immigration: A Survey of the Issues*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Hugo, G. 1996a. Environmental concerns and international migration. *International Migration Review* 30(1):105-131.

Hugo, G. 1996b. Global mobility. In P. Newton and M. Bell (eds), *Population Shift: Mobility and Change in Australia*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Iredale, R. 1994. Patterns of spouse/fiance sponsorship to Australia. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 3(4):547-566.

Iredale, R. 1995. Serial sponsorship: immigration policy and human rights. *Just Policy* 3:37-43.

Joint Standing Committee on Migration. 1994. *Asylum, Border Control and Detention*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Joint Standing Committee on Migration Regulations. 1992. *Australia's Refugee and Humanitarian System: Achieving a Balance Between Refuge and Control*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Jones, B. 1994. *Australia's Population 'Carrying Capacity': One Nation — Two Ecologies, Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee for Long Term Strategies*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Jupp, J. 1966. *Arrivals and Departures*. Melbourne: Lansdowne Press.

Jupp, J. 1991. *Immigration*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Jupp, J. 1993. The ethnic lobby and immigration policy. In J. Jupp and M. Kabala (eds), *The Politics of Australian Immigration*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Jupp, J. 1995. Disentangling the current debate on immigration. *Briefing: Australian Institute of Jewish Affairs Inc.* No. 30, August.

Kane, H. 1995. *The Hour of Departure: Forces that Create Refugees and Migrants*, Worldwatch Paper 125. Washington: Worldwatch Institute.

Kaplan, R. 1996. The *Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. New York: Random House.

Kidd, M. and F. Braun. 1992. *Problems Encountered by Overseas-trained Doctors Migrating to Australia*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Kinnard, B. 1996. Temporary-entry migration: balancing corporate rights and Australian work opportunities. *People and Place* 4(1):55-62.

Kovacs, M. and A. Cropley. 1975. *Immigrants and Society: Alienation and Assimilation*. Sydney: McGraw-Hill.

Lever-Tracy, C. and M. Quinlan. 1988. *A Divided Working Class: Ethnic Segmentation and Industrial Conflict in Australia*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

London, H.I. 1970. *Non-White Immigration and the 'White Australia' Policy*. New York: New York University Press.

Lynch, P. 1971. Discussion on Appleyard. In *How Many Australians? Immigration and Growth, Australian Institute of Political Science, Proceedings of the 37th Summer School*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

Lyotard, J.-F. 1993. The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge. In J. Farganis (ed.), *Readings in Social Theory: The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Markus, A. and M. Rickleffs (eds). 1985. *Surrender Australia? Essays in the Study and Uses of History: Geoffrey Blainey and Asian Immigration.* Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Martin, J. 1971. Migration and social pluralism. In *How Many Australians? Immigration and Growth, Australian Institute of Political Science, Proceedings of the 37th Summer School.* Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

Martin, J. 1978. *The Migrant Presence.* Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Martin, P. 1995. The United States: benign neglect towards immigration. In F. Heckmann and W. Bosswick (eds), *Migration Policies — a Comparative Perspective,* Proceedings of a conference of the European Forum for Migration Studies, Bamberg, Germany, 25 to 28 November, Stuttgart: Enke.

Massey, D.S., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino and J.E. Taylor. 1993. Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal. *Population and Development Review* 19(3):431-466.

Mathew, P. 1995. Retreating from the refugee convention. In P. Alston and M. Chiam (eds), *Treaty-Making and Australia: Globalisation Versus Sovereignty?* Sydney: The Federation Press.

Matwijiw, P. 1988. Public policy on immigrants. Pp.925-929 in J. Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, its People and their Origins.* Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

McNicoll, G. 1995. Institutional impediments to population policy in Australia. *Journal of the Australian Population Association* 12(2):97-112.

Menadue Committee. 1994. Evaluation of the Bureau of Immigration and Population Research. Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, October.

Milner, A. 1991. *Contemporary Cultural Theory: An Introduction.* Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Morrissey, M., C. Mitchell and A. Rutherford. 1991. The *Family in the Settlement Process.* Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). 1944. *Interim Report of the National Health and Medical Research Council on the Decline in the Birth Rate, Eighteenth Session.* Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer.

National Population Council (NPC). 1988. *Immigration Selection Systems.* Report of a Working Party of the National Population Council, (Chair, G. Withers).

Nieuwenhuysen, J. 1995. *The Recent Work of the Bureau of Immigration, Multiculturalism and Population Research.* Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

O'Malley, P. 1978. Australian immigration policies and the dirty worker syndrome. In R. Birrell and C. Hay (eds), *The Immigration Issue in Australia.* Bundoora: Department of Sociology, La Trobe University.

Office of Multicultural Affairs. 1989. *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia ... Sharing Our Future.* Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Ongley, P. and D. Pearson. 1995. Post 1945 international migration: New Zealand, Australia and Canada compared. *International Migration Review* 29(3):765-793.

Palfreeman, A.C. 1967. *The Administration of the White Australia Policy.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Parkin, A. and L. Hardcastle. 1993. Immigration politics in the USA and Canada. In J. Jupp and M. Kabala (eds), *The Politics of Australian Immigration.* Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Phillips, P.D. and G.L. Wood (eds). 1928. *The Peopling of Australia.* Melbourne: Macmillan.

Piore, M. 1979. *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour in Industrial Societies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Poate, H. 1994. Farewell speech. Principal research officer, Canberra Research Section, Bureau of Immigration and Population Research, 16 September (mimeo).

Price, C. 1963. *Southern Europeans in Australia.* Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Price, C. 1974. *The Great White Walls are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia 1836-1888.* Canberra: Australian National University Press.

Price, C. 1979. *Australian Immigration: A Bibliography and Digest, No. 4.* Canberra: Department of Demography, Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University.

Price, C. 1982. *Committee of Review on Migrant Assessment: Statement of Findings* Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Price, C. 1993. Net immigration and population growth. *People and Place* 1(3):32-35.
Reynolds, H. 1996. Unrestrained and dangerous. *The Australian*, 25 September:13.
Rivett, K. (ed.). 1962. *Immigration: Control or Colour Bar?* Immigration Reform Group. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Rivett, K. (ed.). 1975. *Australia and the Non-White Migrant*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Rivett, K. 1988. Refugees. Pp.933-938 in J. Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, its People and their Origins*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.
Rubenstein, C. 1993. Immigration and the Liberal Party of Australia. In J. Jupp and M. Kabala (eds), *The Politics of Australian Immigration*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Schuck, P.H. 1992. Immigration, refugee, and citizenship law in the United States. In D. Horowitz and G. Noiriel (eds), *Immigrants in Two Democracies: French and American Experience*. New York: New York University Press.
Sharp, P. 1971. Why continue immigration?. In *How Many Australians? Immigration and Growth, Australian Institute of Political Science, Proceedings of the 37th Summer School*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.
Shu, J. 1996. The role of social networks in the initial settlement process: results from the BIMPR longitudinal survey. Workshop: Immigration and Australia's population in the 21st Century, Canberra.
Sloan, J. and S. Kennedy. 1992. *Temporary Movements of People to and from Australia*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Smith, J.W. (ed.). 1991. *Immigration, Population and Sustainable Environments*. Bedford Park: The Flinders Press.
Stahl, C., R. Ball, C. Inglis and P. Gutman. 1993. Global *Population Movements and their Implications for Australia*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Storer, D. 1975. *But I Wouldn't Want my Wife to Work Here ...: A Study of Migrant Women in Melbourne Industry*. Melbourne: Centre for Urban Research and Action.
Storer, D. 1984. Migrant workers in Victoria: trends in employment and segmentation. *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 5(3):5-35.
Taylor, G. 1947. *Australia: A Study of Warm Environments and their Effect on British Settlement*. First Edition 1940. London: Methuen.
Thomas, T. and M. Balnaves. 1993. *New Land, Last Home: The Vietnamese Elderly and the Family Migration Program*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Thurow, L. 1996. *The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces will Shape Tomorrow's World*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Turner, B. 1993. Contemporary problems in the theory of citizenship. In B. Turner (ed.), *Citizenship and Social Theory*. London: Sage.
United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (UNICPD). 1994. *Australia: National Report on Population for the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo 1994*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Vernon, J. 1965. *Report of the Committee of Economic Enquiry*. Melbourne: Commonwealth of Australia.
Viviani, N. 1984. *The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Wadham, S., R. Kent Wilson and J. Woods. 1964. *Land Utilization in Australia*. Fourth Edition. (First Edition 1939). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Walsh, M. 1971. The politics of it all. In *How Many Australians? Immigration and Growth, Australian Institute of Political Science, Proceedings of the 37th Summer School*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.
Warhurst, J. 1993. The growth lobby and its opponents: business, unions, environmentalists and other interest groups. In J. Jupp and M. Kabala (eds), *The Politics of Australian Immigration*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
Widgren, J. 1994. *A Comparative Analysis of Entry and Asylum Policies in Selected Western Countries*. ICPDM, Möllwaldplatz 4, A-1040 Vienna, Austria.
Wihtol de Wenden, C. 1994. The French response to the asylum seeker influx, 1980-93. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 534(July):81-90.

Wilkinson, H.L. 1930. *The World's Population Problems and a White Australia.* London: P.S. King and Son.

Wilton, J. and R. Bosworth. 1984. *Old Worlds and New Australia: The Post-War Migrant Experience.* Melbourne: Penguin.

Withers, G. 1991. *Population Issues and Australia's Future: Environment, Economy and Society.* National Population Council, Population Issues Committee. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Wood, A. 1994. Gatekeepers of immigration policy lose the key. *The Australian,* 20 September:15.

Yarwood, A.T. 1964. *Asian Migration to Australia: The Background to Exclusion, 1896-1923.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Yarwood, A.T. 1988. The white Australia policy. In J. Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, its People and their Origins.* Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

Zolberg, A.R. 1993. Are the industrial countries under siege? In G. Luciani (ed.), *Migration Policies in Europe and the United States.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.